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Implementation problems have emerged as one of the key items 
in the international negotiating agenda. This paper analyses the 
experiences of Chile and Mexico in implementing trade agreements. 
The negotiations of FTAs have implied changing the institutional 
environment of Latin American countries. Transparency obligations 
are changing the way policies in general are formulated, adopted and 
implemented. Other obligations have created the need to introduce 
new legislation where it did not exist. Implementation takes place at 
different moments in time and at different stages of the negotiations 
and operation of the trade agreements. How implementation problems 
have been addressed and to what extent it has been effective is a major 
concern. In fact, these aspects are related to the activities developed by 
multilateral and regional organisations, both in support of multilateral 
and regional trade negotiations. But within the context of recent 
bilateral negotiations, specific chapters dealing with trade capacity 
building have been negotiated (CAFTA), current negotiations (CAN-
US). 
The paper focuses it attention on the Chilean and Mexican 
experiences with trade agreements and provides explanations 
regarding their relative success. 





This paper analyses the salient issues that have emerged in the 
context of negotiations and implementations of free trade agreements 
(FTA) in Latin America, focusing on the experiences of Mexico and 
Chile. These countries have been chosen because they have the most 
extensive network of free trade agreements with countries within and 
outside the region. The first section discusses the different models of 
trade agreement followed in the region and the main differences 
between them. Section II focuses on the Mexican case especially with 
NAFTA—and on Chile with different negotiating experiences—. 
Section III analyses the contentious issues that have emerged in trade 
relationship between Mexico, Chile and their trading partners. The 
fourth section addresses the issues of implementation and institutional 
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I.  Free Trade Agreements in the 
Americas: The Models 
Since the early nineties, Latin American countries (LAC) 
embarked in an intensive integration process. Some countries decided 
to build their new economic partnership through the old integration 
framework, but following a new approach that would reflect the 
economic policy reforms undertaken since the end of the eighties. 
Others decided to adopt a fresh approach building in the “new 
integration paradigm”. 
For instance, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay created 
the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) in Asunción, Paraguay, in 
November, 1991. This agreement was negotiated under the framework 
of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI)1 Treaty 
signed in Montevideo, Uruguay in August, 1980.  
ALADI is a highly flexible framework that contemplates three 
types of agreements among its members: a regional tariff preference, 
regional scope agreements,2 and partial scope agreements,3 including 
economic complementation agreements.4 Trade agreements negotiated 
under ALADI so far have covered mainly trade in goods, although 
they may also include services, investment and other trade provisions. 
ALADI was notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause (see table 1). 
                                                     
1
 Latin American Integration Association. 
2
 Regional scope agreements are those in which all member countries participate. 
3
 Partial scope agreements are those in which not all member countries participate. 
4
 Aimed, among other objectives, to promote maximum utilisation of production factors, stimulate economic complementation, 
ensure equitable conditions for competition, facilitate entry of products into the international market, and encourage the balanced 
and harmonious development of member countries, (article 11, ALADI Treaty). 
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The members of the Andean Pact decided to renew the 1969 Cartagena Agreement, and to 
create the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) in March 1996. This renovated agreement 
entered into force in June 1997; thereafter a number of additional protocols have been negotiated in 
order to adjust the legal structure of the old agreement to the new framework. This is one of the 
most elaborated trade pacts in Latin America, its covers a wide range of issues, including a Court 
of Justice, and a Parliament modelled after the European Union experience. This approach is 
different from the one followed by the MERCOSUR, which in its ten years of existence has relied 
on a very weak legal and institutional framework.  
Although this is not a trivial difference, between the two custom unions of the region, 
MERCOSUR has shown a stronger partnership among its members. In fact, if we analyse the 
agreements negotiated in the region by both trade blocks, only MERCOSUR has a set of 
agreements negotiated as a single entity. On the other hand, both the Andean Community and its 
members have trade agreements of their own, which raises questions with regard to the 
commitments of its members with regards to the common integration framework. In fact, today, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are negotiating an FTA with the U.S., which will probably be 
modelled under the NAFTA. 


























Source: World Trade Organization. 
Notes: Trade agreements notified until January 5, 2005. 
(1) Mercosur: Mercado Común del Sur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
(2) NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement: Canada, Mexico and United States.  
(3) CAN: Comunidad Andina de Naciones: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
(4) ALADI: Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela 
 
Mexico decided in 1990 to start negotiating an FTA with the U.S. After almost a year of 
talks, a new integration model was created. Although the architecture of the agreement and its 
content are designed on the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the jurisprudence of the multilateral 
trading system, and the parallel negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the treatment of key aspects of 
the agreements —intellectual property, investment and services— is deeper and more advanced 
than any other integration scheme negotiated before, with the exception of the European Union. 
This model, with some adjustment and updates, has been promoted by Mexico, first, and Chile 
later, in its bilateral negotiation within and outside the region. 
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These two approaches, NAFTA and ALADI integration models have clashed in the context 
of the Free Trade Agreements of the Americas (FTAA), neutralising the negotiating process. 
Finally, the U.S. decided to follow a NAFTA-plus-type agreement in its bilateral negotiations, both 
with LAC and outside the hemisphere, spreading the model. 
Table 2 
THE OLD AND THE NEW INTEGRATION PROCESSES 
OLD NEW 
TRADE COVERAGE 
Mainly trade in goods liberalisation Broad 
(goods, services, investments, intellectual property, 
government procurement, SPS, TBT, etc.) 
TRADE LIBERALISATION IN GOODS 
Mainly preferential trade agreements with limited 
trade coverage and partial tariff reduction 
Negative lists and automatic schedules, limited 
exceptions (less than 10 percent of trade) 
RULES OF ORIGIN 
Simple rules across tariff universe Complex rules and families of rules of origin 
OVERALL ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY 
Import substitution/inward-looking development 
strategies, high, differentiated and disperse tariffs 
structure 
Export-led oriented strategies, lower tariff 
protection, differentiated structure but less disperse  
INTEGRATION MODEL 
European-type integration approach based on 
ALADI framework 
Free Trade Agreements modelled in NAFTA-type 
provisions 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Bureaucratic style approach, supra national 
secretariats and weak dispute-settlement 
mechanism 
Members driven, no bureaucratic institutional 
arrangements, except CAN agreement, stronger 
dispute settlement, except in ALADI-type 
agreements.  
Source: based in Devlin & Estevadeordal (2001) and Devlin & Giordano (2004), and own elaboration. 
 
Although the new integration wave in LAC follows new models and is based on outward-
looking policies, the ALADI framework continues to be intensively used by its members. In fact, if 
we take into account the number of agreements signed under the ALADI’s umbrella, it is quite 
impressive although some of them in terms of trade may not be significant (www.aladi.org). 
But the new spirit is reflected in the substantive content of the agreements signed in the 
region. Table 2 summarises some of the most salient features of today’s integration process. In the 
first place, as pointed out by various authors, the integration process is part of, and coherent with 
the overall reform process that was initiated in late eighties and early nineties. In fact, unilateral 
trade reforms reduced the average tariff rate in the region from 40% to 12%, and reduced the 
dispersion of the tariff, from 30% in the mid eighties to 9% (Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2001). 
Regional trade agreements have been used to complement unilateral and multilateral 
liberalisation, and as a vehicle for further deepening economic reforms. Finally, trade agreements, 
embedded in a legally binding contract, are considered a lock-in instrument to prevent policy 
reversal.  
One important characteristic of the ALADI-type agreements negotiated during the 90s is that 
although they covered a substantial share of trade, they were based on a set of simple rules, 
modelled in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) disciplines. This aspect helps to 
exemplify the proliferation of agreements. But this characteristic also explains the institutional 
weaknesses of those agreements. 
The NAFTA had a special impact at the regional level. It was the first agreement negotiated 
between a developing country and two G7 members. This was a not only an economic impact, but a 
political phenomenon. Shortly after the conclusion of NAFTA, Mexico began negotiating with 
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countries in the Hemisphere based on the new model (table 3), much more complex than the 
ALADI-type agreement, not only regarding investment and services disciplines, two important 
“new trade dimensions”, but also regarding requirements and administration of trade in goods.  
The NAFTA-type agreements differ in a number of aspects with the ALADI models. To 
begin with, trade in goods rules are more elaborated and demanding in terms of implementation. In 
particular, customs and rules of origin procedures, and rules of origin requirements. Also, in terms 
of issue coverage, the agreements are more complex. Regarding investment and services 
provisions, for instance, the agreements contemplate stronger rules and commitments. Finally, the 
adoption of a solid dispute settlement mechanism is probably the most significant institutional 
improvement adopted by the LAC in their new wave of negotiations. Only MERCOSUR has 
marginalised itself from the use of these models and has emphasised WTO-type rules on its 
negotiations in the region and with other trading partners, like the EU.5  
In terms of institutional arrangements, with the exception of CAN, all the new agreements 
adopted a member’s driven approach. There are no supranational secretariats to run the 
administrative and substantive issues of the agreements, and governments have had to strengthen 
their domestic bureaucracies in charge of trade matters to monitor their functioning. This is an 
important difference with regards to the old integration process that relies in an international 
bureaucracy and supranational institutions that never reached the importance of its source of 
inspiration: the European Union.  
Chile and Mexico have been the most active countries in international trade negotiations. 
Both of them have embarked in negotiations with countries within and outside the Western 




                                                     
5
 It is interesting to notice that Uruguay, a member of MERCOSUR, signed a full bilateral FTA with Mexico following a NAFTA-
type agreement (table 3). 
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II.  FTA and Institutional Reforms 
Chile and Mexico share common policy features. First, they 
began their policy reform relatively early: Chile in the mid seventies, 
and Mexico in the mid eighties. This implies that economic policy and 
trade reforms have been more stable, in spite of deep economic crises. 
The maturity of the reform process has provided, in both cases, 
enough time for reforms to yield results and acquire a reasonable 
degree of political consensus in the society. Both started an active 
integration process through trade agreements in the early 1990s, which 
because of time frame can best be assessed. In both cases trade 
agreements have played a key role to support policy stability during 
critical period by narrowing the policy options and limiting policy 
reversal; for instance, tariff rate increases (GAO, 1997). 
A. The case of Mexico 
Mexico embarked in policy reforms triggered by the Debt Crisis 
in 1982. This reform process aimed at stabilising the economy; in the 
area of trade reform the process contemplated accession to the old 
GATT that concluded in 1986 (Ortiz Mena, 2004).  
During this period, trade relations with the U.S. were pursued 
under the framework of different bilateral arrangements that—in 
retrospect—created the playing field for what later became the 
NAFTA. Bilateral integration with the U.S. was quickly perceived as a 
means to attract investments and support the export-led development 
strategy; economic reform per se did not ensure export growth and 
was not sufficient to attract  investment,  as examined in Cameron & 
Implementing trade policy in Latin America: The cases of Chile and Mexico 
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Tomlin (2000) and Katz (2001). Therefore, the move to a strategy of bilateral trade negotiations 
was driven by economic consideration from the Mexican perspective. From the U.S. perspective, 
both economic and foreign affairs considerations were very significant. For Canada, the need to 
preserve its preferential access to the U.S. market was the main driving force. 
Prior to the beginning of negotiations, during the second half of the eighties and early 
nineties, further reforms were undertaken. A privatisation program was carried out, foreign 
investment restrictions were severely limited, non-tariff restrictions were further reduced, subsidies 
were limited or eliminated, and a deregulatory reform was started (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000).  
During the negotiations, several legal reforms were prepared that had to be ready before the 
entry into force of the agreements: the foreign investment statute was further liberalised to reflect 
NAFTA commitments. Telecommunications, intellectual property and trade remedy laws were 
enacted in that first stage (GAO, 1997).  
Others aspects, more politically sensitive for all countries, were left aside by the negotiators 
or special arrangements were found —energy sector, cultural industries, automobiles, textiles and 
apparel and, last but no least, some agricultural products— reducing the political risk of approval 
and implementation (Katz, 2001); (Hufbauer and Schott, 2004). This aspect clearly shows the 
interest of the parties involved in reaching a meaningful, but politically viable agreement. The 
players were all conscious of the historic step they were taking and the very unique political 
juncture in the three countries (Katz, 2001).  
By agreeing to address politically sensitive issues in a mutually convenient manner, countries 
were devising compensatory arrangements in exchange for concessions. For instance, Mexico was 
allowed to maintain its limitations in the energy sector, but a Chapter on energy, initially resisted 
by Mexico, was included. At the same time, Mexico opened PEMEX procurement to NAFTA 
partners as part of the deal (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993). In other cases, (e.g. financial services), the 
compensatory measure took the form of a transition period for liberalisation, coupled with special 
safeguards to promote an orderly adjustment of the market to the new scenario. 




MEXICO’S TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PARTNER TYPE OF 
AGREEMENT 
LEGAL STATUS MODEL 
Mexico-Chile FTA In force since  
1 January 1992.  
ALADI – upgrade to NAFTA 
model in 1999 
NAFTA between Mexico, United 
States and Canada 
FTA In force since  
1 January 1994 
Original model 
G3 FTA between Mexico, 
Venezuela and Colombia 
FTA 1 January 1995 NAFTA-type model 
Mexico-Costa Rica FTA 1 January 1995 NAFTA-type model 
Mexico-Bolivia  FTA 1 January 1995  NAFTA-type model 





 ALADI type 
Mexico-Uruguay  FTA 15 November 2003. NAFTA-type model 
Mexico-EU FTA 1 July 2000 WTO-based agreement 
Mexico-Israel  FTA 1 July 2000 Covers trade in goods 
Mexico-European Free Trade 
Association 
FTA 1 July 2001 WTO-based agreement 
Mexico-Northern Triangle (El 




14 March 2001 NAFTA-type model 
Mexico-Japan FTA 1 April 2005 NAFTA-type model 
Mexico-Mercosur ECA July and September 
2002 
ALADI-type framework 
agreement and automobile 
agreement 




24 April 1986 ALADI-type agreement 
Source: www.sice.org 
Notes: ECA: Economic complementation agreements, ALADI. 
   FTA: Free trade agreements. 
 
Finally, the agreements’ institutional arrangements helped to better implement provisions 
and resolve certain problems. In fact, through commissions, working groups, and the dispute 
settlement mechanism, in particular during the consultations phase. Moreover, these sets of 
working options have created a general framework for dealing with increasingly complex issues, 
like the post-September 11 security agenda (Hufbauer and Schott, 2004).  
An important aspect that emerged in several Latin American countries was related to the 
responsibility for trade negotiations. Mexico was no exception. In fact, President Salinas 
transferred all responsibility for trade negotiations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development (SECOFI) today the Ministry of Economy. At the 
governmental level, all the negotiations were handled in a “petit comité”, and an articulated 
consultation scheme between the public and the private sector was created (Ortiz Mena, 2001). 
This is a key institutional aspect to formulate and conduct trade policy that has been maintained 
relatively stable until now.  
Mexico undertook other significant institutional changes to address the challenges and 
opportunities opened by economic reforms and trade agreements. One major concern was how to 
create a more business-friendly environment and to promote the operation of market forces.  
As was mentioned, as part of NAFTA obligations on competition policy, countries “shall 
adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anti-competitive business conduct and take appropriate 
action with respect thereto, recognising that such measures will enhance the fulfilment of the 
Implementing trade policy in Latin America: The cases of Chile and Mexico 
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objectives of this Agreement” (Article 1501). Mexico approved an antitrust law in December 1992 
that became effective in June 1993. This law incorporated all the necessary elements to prevent 
anti-competitive practices by private operators and even state-owned companies, and is a very 
important legislation that complemented the economic reforms undertaken since mid 80s. Over the 
years, the Federal Competition Commission responsible for the administration of the law has 
overcome the cultural resistance to these important institutions, and today it is considered a 
respectable and credible entity (see OCDE/BID, 2004).  
In 2000, a new independent commission was created: the Federal Commission for 
Regulatory Improvement (Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria). This Commission is the 
successor of the Economic Deregulation Unit (Unidad de Desregulación Económica) created at the 
end of the 1980s at the old Ministry of Trade. The Law mandates all Mexican Federal entities to 
submit for review any regulation that they are planning to enact and, among other things, to present 
a regulatory assessment (cost/benefit) of the measures. The Commission sends back the proposal 
with its approval or presents all its negative comments to the draft. All the exchanges of opinions 
between the Commission and the submitting agency are public and the comments are taken into 
account by the President’s Legal Advisor, who must approve the final proposal before publication. 
These two Commissions have improved significantly the regulatory environment for business, 
transparency and quality of state intervention in the Mexican economy.  
Transparency requirements in FTAs are a very significant obligation. They provide a 
minimum standard for trade regulation, reduce transaction cost and enhance public participation in 
public policy formulation, adoption and application. All NAFTA chapters contain transparency 
provisions that enhance good regulatory practices and participation.  
NAFTA provisions contain several lock-in arrangements that tie up the three partners, 
reducing the scope for liberalisation outside the NAFTA framework. For instance, the investment 
and services chapters’ most favoured clause ensure that post-NAFTA negotiations of any partner 
must be extended automatically and unconditionally to the other partners. In general, all three 
partners have extended NAFTA parity in their trade negotiations with others partners, but have not 
gone beyond the liberalisation contemplated in the agreement between the three. No significant 
liberalisation of their respective regime has taken place in the context of FTA liberalisation.  
This does not mean that NAFTA partners have not pursued liberalisation. In fact, in key 
areas like financial services and telecommunications, important regulatory reforms and 
liberalisation have taken place and have been reflected in WTO negotiations. But no liberalisation 
has been the result of post-NAFTA bilateral trade negotiations.  
B. The case of Chile 
In Chile, economic and trade reforms were undertaken in two phases. The first took place in 
the mid-seventies and its purpose was to reduce tariff protection and dispersion, and eliminate all 
unjustified non-tariff measures (i.e., quotas, licensing requirements and permits), and to eliminate 
bias against exports. This process ended in 1979 when a uniform 10% tariff rate was adopted and 
the exchange rate was fixed. After a severe debt crisis between 1982 and 1985, and some policy 
reversal, a new economic reform process was carried out; with a second wave of privatisations that 
included electricity, telecommunications and other big public enterprises. Also a new tariff 
reduction was adopted, together with several instruments to promote exports. 
When bilateral negotiations started, Chile had a relatively open and stable trade regime, tariff 
rates were 15%, non-tariff measures were almost non existent and the role of the state in the 
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economy was reduced. The reform process had begun to show its benefits and there was political 
consensus with regard to the future policy direction (see Aninat, Londregan, Navia and Vial, 2004). 
Nevertheless, there were certain areas where Chile had to introduce legislation. In fact, in the 
early 90s intellectual property was a high priority in the U.S. trade agenda. In 1991, Chile was the 
first Latin American country to enact a patent law. The environmental legislation was out of date 
and dispersed in different laws; finally, there were no mandatory environmental assessment for 
investors. The new environmental law addressing all urgent matters entered into force in March 
1994. The labour code was reviewed to improve workers’ rights, but this latter aspect was much 
more a domestic political issue aimed at strengthening labour movement. 
Table 4 
CHILE’S FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PARTNER TYPE OF 
AGREEMENT 
LEGAL STATUS MODEL 
Bolivia ECA Nº22 7 July 1993 ALADI, covers a limited 
number of products 
Canada FTA 5 June 1997 NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
Central America  FTA 18 October 1999 NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
Colombia ECA Nº24  1 January 1994 ALADI, goods 
Costa Rica  14 February 2002 (Bilateral 
Protocol) 
NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
Cuba Partial scope 
agreement 
Under Congress consideration ALADI, covers a limited 
number of products 
Ecuador  ECA Nº32 1 January 1995 ALADI, goods 
EFTA  FTA In force since end 2004 GATT, GATS + some 
Investments provisions  
El Salvador   3 June 2002 (Bilateral 
Protocol) 
NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
United States FTA 1 January 2004 NAFTA (+) 
Guatemala  Bilateral Protocol not 
concluded 
NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
Honduras  Bilateral Protocol not 
concluded 
NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
MERCOSUR ECA Nº35 1 October 1996 ALADI, goods 
Mexico FTA 1 August 1999 NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
Nicaragua  Bilateral Protocol not 
concluded 
NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
Peru  ECA Nº38 1 July 1998 ALADI, goods 
Republic of Korea  FTA 1 April 2004 NAFTA (-), goods, services, 
investments 
European Union Association 
Agreement 
1 February 2003 GATT, GATS + some 
Investments provisions  
Venezuela ECA Nº23 1 July 1993 ALADI, goods 
Source: www.direcon.cl 
ECA: Economic complementation agreements, ALADI. 
FTA: Free trade agreements. 
NAFTA (+): Provisions included go beyond NAFTA in several chapters, intellectual property rights, 
electronic commerce, labour and environment. 
NAFTA (-): Agreement is modelled in NAFTA but does not contains all its provisions, for instance, in 
intellectual property, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS) and others. 
 
The decision to start bilateral or regional negotiations was taken at the beginning of the 
nineties, as part of the economic program of the new democratic government. But it was rather a 
foreign policy instrument, whose purpose was to re-insert Chile in the international community, 
Implementing trade policy in Latin America: The cases of Chile and Mexico 
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than a trade policy strategy aimed at promoting exports. Later on, when Chile’s exports started to 
face trade restrictions, (apple exports to the EU), the government acknowledged the importance of 
the economic fundamentals of trade agreements, as analysed in Sáez and Valdés (1999) and Sáez 
(1999).  
At the beginning, the government had to overcome opposition from different fronts; private 
sector associations and orthodox economists argued that the best policy still was unilateral trade 
liberalisation. Bilateral or regional trade agreements, they claimed, created distortions and were a 
second-best policy. The biggest opposition was against negotiations with Latin American countries 
because of their macroeconomic instability and microeconomic distortions (subsidies). It was never 
quite clear what were in reality the reasons for this opposition, probably ignorance was one aspect: 
both the public and the private sectors were beginning to learn. In the medium term, private sector 
representatives got involved actively in the process and became very enthusiastic about trade 
negotiations. 
Some opposition emerged from labour representatives and non-governmental organisations 
related to the “social movement”. But this latter opposition has never been very influential and 
articulated.  
Although the general economic framework in Chile was appropriate for trade negotiations, 
there were important institutional issues that had to be addressed. In fact, unilateral trade 
liberalisation implied that there was very little expertise on what trade agreement really meant, and 
trade agreements were associated with the old integration paradigm. The Dirección General de 
Relaciones Internacionales at the Foreign Affairs Ministry in charge of the issue had a few experts 
on GATT-type agreements, but more expertise on ALADI-type treaties. Because of this weakness, 
it was not clear which agency was better suited for negotiations. Both the ministries of Finance and 
of Economy considered themselves to be better prepared for dealing with negotiations and, during 
1990-1994; three ministries shared responsibility for these topics. After the negotiations between 
Canada and Chile, Foreign Affairs took charge of the responsibility of negotiations; several co-
ordination entities were created with few changes until today. Private sector participation was also 
encouraged through consultative committees and also on modalities similar to the one created by 
the Mexican authorities.  
Trade negotiations in Chile have always been tensioned by the agricultural sector. In fact, 
despite the fact that agricultural products have been one of the most dynamic export areas 
accounting for more than 15% of total exports, the main opposition to FTA has been articulated 
from the “traditional”, inward oriented agricultural crops. To tune down opposition, this sector has 
been granted longer transitional periods, especial tariff and quota regimes for gradual liberalisation, 
and it has pressed for financial support (see below).  
Depending on the country confronted in negotiations, the textile and apparel sectors have 
adopted different stances vis á vis FTAs. When dealing with countries that are net exporters of 
these products, this sector tends to take a conservative approach. But during the negotiations with 
the EU and the U.S. it was eager to have access to these markets as a way to compensate for the 
continuing decline of its share in the domestic market in favour of imports from Asian countries. 
In recent years, new sectors concerned with globalisation have emerged and demanded to be 
excluded from FTA provisions. In particular, the so-called “cultural industries” interested in 
preserving cultural diversity have demanded that cultural exceptions be included in the agreements. 
The government has negotiated this type of clause and reserves in the agreements with Canada, EU 
and U.S. but their scopes differ. 
CEPAL − SERIE Comercio internacional N° 54 
 
21 
III. Implementation Issues 
Implementation is ensured through different mechanisms and 
during several stages of the process. Prior to the beginning of 
negotiations, certain conditions are established, and amendments to 
certain laws (intellectual property rights, or elimination of certain 
trade barriers) are made. During the negotiations, several legal reforms 
may be introduced in order to prepare the overall legal framework to 
the new set of obligations. Before the agreement is made effective 
some changes or new legislation may be introduced in order to ensure 
consistency of domestic law with the new provisions. At this stage, 
other problems may arise. In many cases, the treaty contemplates a 
transitional period until the new obligations are fully in effect, during 
which the parties have time to draft and approve the necessary bills or 
introduce the required administrative regulations.  
For instance, during the approval process of the association 
agreement between Chile and MERCOSUR, the strong opposition of 
the “traditional” agricultural sector (producers of wheat, sugar beet, 
and oilseeds) forced the government to commit financial resources to 
compensate for the “negative effects” of the agreement. Everyone in 
the political spectrum, both government and opposition, could 
potentially be affected because this was a cross-cutting issue. To avoid 
the loss of congressmen from the governing coalition, the government 
offered a budget reallocation of the equivalent to 3% of 1999 the fiscal 
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budget (Aninat, Londregan, Navia and Vial, 2004).6 
Also, to help pass the NAFTA in the U.S. Congress, creative initiatives were elaborated: the 
side agreements on labour and environment, and the Trade Adjustment Assistance program.  
If not adequately controlled, the promises made and engagements adopted may produce 
outcomes incompatible with the obligations under the agreement itself and possibly conflicts with 
its trading partners.  
Finally, the agreements’ institutional arrangements help to better implement provisions and 
resolve certain problems: commissions, working groups and periodical meetings help to monitor 
the implementation of obligations.  
Nevertheless, certain good faith implementation problems may arise. One source of 
difficulties are the procedures whereby treaties are approved under domestic law. In the Latin 
American legal tradition, as well as in other countries, the legislative power approves the 
agreements as such and prevailing over their previous legislation. Congress approves the treaty and 
not directly the amendments of the laws that are affected by the obligations thereunder. It is 
difficult to know how and to what extent the new agreements have amended or derogated domestic 
regulations that might conflict with some of the provisions in the new treaty. This problem must be 
resolved internally by the national Courts or by the dispute settlements procedures, including the 
consultations phase.  
Whenever a government tries to modify its domestic legislation to accommodate the 
disciplines of a treaty after its approval, it may face bigger opposition from interest groups that 
resist the changes. In these cases, interested parties may fully realise the scope of the obligations, or 
they may have their own interpretation of their nature and try to influence the outcome. Because 
the agreement had been approved by congress and is already in force, the government will be less 
pressed to pass the implementing law, violating the international obligation. For instance, it took 
Chile almost four years to approve a law to specifically “adapt” certain domestic legislation to 
WTO obligations, although the agreement was “law” under the Chilean legal system.  
Another legitimate source of problems is difference of interpretation of the substantive law, 
i.e., what is the correct meaning of the obligation. In this case, normally the problem will be 
resolved through consultations and possibly through the dispute settlement system.  
More difficulties may arise from lack of resources to implement the obligations. As has been 
pointed out by Finger and Schuller (2002), in many cases the problem is not the obligation itself 
contained in the agreement, but all the necessary additional elements that are needed for its 
adequate implementation. A case in point is the customs valuation agreement of the WTO. The 
agreement itself provides for the different criteria that must be applied by countries when assessing 
the transaction value of import products. Nevertheless, this obligation supposes that the customs 
authority has the necessary infrastructure to perform its duties. In fact, normally they do not have 
adequate trained personnel, information technology infrastructure is minimal and they lack modern 
administrative processes, risk assessment policies and/or are not capable of performing physical 
control in all ports.  
Intellectual property rights are another example. The TRIPS agreements, and NAFTA 
provisions are not only legally complex, but the different infrastructure requirements are very 
                                                     
6
 The financial resources were assigned: “to spend more money on government efforts to promote exports; to emphasize lower tariffs 
on inputs for traditional agriculture when forming commercial treaties; to spend more money on the technological development of 
agriculture; to spend more money subsidizing grazing land, tree farms, and to include small farmers, to expand subsidies for 
vocational education and for government centers designed to help businesses develop in rural areas; to provide cheap loans (in 
dollars) to farmers; to support “environmentally sustainable” farming and to spend more money on soil restoration” (Aninat, 
Londregan, Navia and Vial ,2004). 
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costly, and go beyond the direct administration of the system: even the courts system may be 
affected. Actually, Mexico invested $32 million dollars for the establishment of an agency to 
implement industrial property law (Finger and Schuller, 2002).  
In the case of the IPR Chapter of the FTA between Chile and the U.S., transitional periods 
were negotiated to gradually modify the Chilean domestic legislation in conformity with the new 
obligations and to ensure that any budgetary increases will be provided on a timely basis.  
It is not easy to assess the degree of implementation of the obligations contained in a trade 
agreement. Proxies that may be used are the number of consultations that a country has to face as a 
respondent. Another proxy are the complaints that may be filed by a trading partner but that do not 
derive into a formal dispute. Other sources are the trade-related legislation that a country submits to 
the Congress. For instance, Chile includes in a draft law to adequate its legislation to certain WTO 
obligation, some additional changes that were part of its bilateral obligations. Taking into account 
these limitations we may try to assess how implementation has proceeded in Chile and Mexico.  
The NAFTA agreement has three types of dispute settlement mechanisms: (i) chapter 11, 
which governs disputes arising between two states or between the State and an investor relating 
with the investment provisions of the agreement; (ii) chapter 19, dealing with disputes involving 
final determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases; and (iii) chapter 20, addressing 
the disputes that arise from all the other provisions of the agreement. 
Table 5 
MEXICO: CONSULTATIONS REQUESTED AT THE WTO: 1995-2005 
Cases Date 
Mexico - Provisional Countervailing Measures on Olive oil from the European 
Communities - Request for Consultations by the European Communities 
24/08/2004 
Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages - Request for 
Consultations by the United States 
18/03/200.4 
Mexico - Certain Pricing Measures for Customs Valuation and Other Purposes - 
Request for Consultations by Guatemala 
25/07/2003 
Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice - Request for 
Consultations by the United States 
23/06/2003 
Mexico - Certain Measures Preventing the Importation of Black Beans from 
Nicaragua - Request for Consultations by Nicaragua 
20/03/2003 
Mexico - Measures Affecting the Import of Matches - Request for Consultations by 
Chile 
28/05/2001 
Mexico - Provisional Anti-dumping Measure on Electric Transformers - Request for 
Consultations by Brazil 
04/01/2001 
Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services - Request for 
Consultations by the United States 
29/08/2000 
Mexico - Measures Affecting Trade in Live Swine - Request for Consultations by the 
United States 
13/07/2000 
Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the 
United States - Request for Consultations by the United States 
15/05/1998 
Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the 
United States - Request for Consultations by the United States 
15/09/1997 
Mexico - Customs Valuation of Imports - Request to Joint Consultations - 
Communication from Switzerland 
30/09/1996 
Mexico - Customs Valuation of Imports - Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities 
09/09/1996 
Source: World Trade Organization. 
 
In more than 10 years, Mexico has faced nine disputes under chapter 11 from investors of the 
other NAFTA countries; fourteen claims under the chapter dealing with the unfair trade practices 
decision adopted by Mexican authorities, not all resolved as yet; and no claims under chapter 20. In 
our view, this is an indication that implementation under the traditional trade areas has been fairly 
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acceptable. To test this first conclusion, it is useful to look at the number of consultations that have 
been requested against Mexico at the WTO. In particular, trade in goods provisions of NAFTA and 
the WTO are very similar, so in many cases instead of having to recourse to NAFTA’s dispute 
settlement mechanism, WTO is an appropriate forum to deal with the issue. Furthermore, using the 
WTO may provide an indication of the fulfilment of other trade obligations vis á vis other trading 
partners. Table 5 shows the number of consultations requested by the WTO members against 
Mexico since 1995. 
Since the WTO entered into force, Mexico has faced thirteen consultations requests, five of 
them dealing with unfair trade practices decisions adopted by Mexico, three dealing with customs 
valuation procedures, the others related to miscellaneous trade issues. One important dispute 
dealing with implementation of obligations was related to the telecommunication sector and the 
services agreement. 
Box 1 























Source: Discussion Paper No. 416, “Constituent Interest Group Influences on U.S. Trade Policies Since 
the Advent of the WTO”, Robert M. Stern, University of Michigan, December 4, 1997 
•   «In December 1995, the U.S. Secretary of Transportation suspended processing of 
applications by Mexican trucking firms to serve U.S. border states pending 
resolution of safety concerns that had been raised especially by the U.S. Teamsters 
union. Despite protests that this was in violation of the NAFTA and that U.S. cross-
border trucking interests were being hurt, the issue remains unresolved. 
•  The USTR determined in April 1996 that Mexico was not in compliance with NAFTA 
requirements for accepting U.S. telecommunications test data and standards 
relating to telecom terminal equipment authorization. Subsequent consultations 
appear to have resolved this dispute. 
• The USTR has expressed concern about piracy and counterfeiting of U.S. 
intellectual property in Mexico. The Mexican Congress passed a reform of 
intellectual property law in December 1996 that may serve to address U.S. 
concerns. 
•  In October 1996, a 5-year suspension agreement was signed specifying that 
tomatoes imported from Mexico will be sold in the United States at, or above, and 
established reference price, and that no antidumping duties would be assessed on 
Mexican tomatoes as long as the agreement remained in effect. The dispute 
settlement request for consultation on this issue filed in the WTO by Mexico was 
subsequently withdrawn. 
•    In 1996, efforts were made in the U.S. Congress to change the U.S. Marine 
Mammal Protection Act and lift the embargo on tuna caught and processed by 
Mexico. This embargo has remained in effect despite the GATT 1991 tuna/dolphin 
panel decision that had ruled against the U.S. position. Mexico has since complied 
with newly specified U.S. standards on dolphin protection, but the U.S. Congress did 
not pass the new legislation because of opposition from some environmental 
groups. 
•    In January 1997, the U.S. Department of Agriculture instituted a partial lifting of an 
83-year old embargo on avocados imported from Mexico, despite opposition from 
California avocado growers. The original embargo had been imposed to prevent 
possible fruit fly contamination. 
•    Safeguards action on broomcorn brooms. The USITC found evidence of serious 
injury, and tariffs were increased for a three-year period on two categories of 
brooms. Mexico retaliated in December 1996 by raising tariffs on eight U.S. 
products. In January 1997, Mexico requested establishment of a dispute settlement 
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These data also tend to confirm the impression that Mexico has had a good record of 
implementation of commitment.  
Box 1 presents a number of issues that emerged between the U.S. and Mexico under the 
NAFTA and how they were handled. The most contentious issue was related with land 
transportation safety and still continues to be. Other problems that have surfaced in the bilateral 
relationship do not seem to be specifically a consequence of NAFTA implementation.  
In the case of Chile, in almost ten years only two types of issues have emerged, regarding 
taxes on alcoholic beverages, and safeguard measures and band price systems (table 6). 
Table 6 
CHILE: CONSULTATIONS REQUESTED AT THE WTO: 1995-2005 
Cases Date 
Chile - Safeguard Measures on Sugar - Request for Consultations by Colombia 22/03/2001 
Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain 
Agricultural Products - Request for Consultations by Guatemala 
10/01/2001 
Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain 
Agricultural Products - Request for Consultations by Argentina 
12/10/2000 
Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages  - Request for Consultations by the United 
States – Corrigendum 
05/02/1998 
Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Request for Consultations by the 
European Communities 
18/12/1997 
Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Request for Consultations by the United 
States 
16/12/1997 
Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Request for Consultations by the 
European Communities 
11/06/1997 
Source: World Trade Organization. 
 
All theses cases ended in dispute and each time Chile lost the claims. But this is not an 
accurate indication of implementation issues. In fact, in 1999 Chile presented to the Congress a 
draft law with several amendments to domestic legislation to make it conform with WTO 
obligations, in particular, but not limited to, regarding customs valuation, border measures for 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and TBT agreements.  
Another draft law that was presented to the Congress and is still under consideration 
introduced a number of changes to the current legislation. This has been a very complicated piece 
of legislation to move forward because of the number of conflicting interests, the high complexity 
of the issues addressed and the politically sensitive aspects that are at stakes.  
Another indication of implementation issues at the bilateral level are the cases that Chile has 
to tackle in the context of bilateral trade agreements in the Region. In this case, again disputes are 
concentrated with “traditional” agricultural products and their special trade regime (price bands). In 
particular, Chile lost a dispute settlement procedure raised by Bolivia regarding the export of 
oilseeds. Bolivia argued successfully that certain administrative changes introduced by the customs 
agency for oilseeds imports, was an impairment of the conditions agreed on in the bilateral 
preferential agreement in force.  
In a similar case, Colombia requested a panel to analyse measures adopted by the customs 
authority regarding certain sugar products imported from Colombia and other origins. In this case 
Chile won two of the three allegations, and as this paper is been written a bilateral dispute has 
arisen regarding a retaliatory measure imposed by Colombia against Chile for allegedly not 
implementing the panel findings.  
In the context of the approval of NAFTA, side agreements on labour and environmental co-
operation were negotiated. Chile adopted this model in the negotiations with Canada. But in the 
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bilateral negotiations with the U.S., labour and environmental provisions were included in the body 
of the agreements and were subjected to the general dispute settlement procedures of the treaty.  
In a report to the U.S. Congress in 1997, the General Accounting Office addressed the issue 
of implementation three and a half years into the agreement. Regarding the setting up of the 
institutionality of the side agreements, there were a few operating problems. In the case of the 
environmental agreement, a work program was agreed and several sub-missions by citizens 
organisations were filed against three NAFTA partners. NAFTA provisions and side agreements on 
the environment have been criticised by some representatives of the environmental community. 
Esty (2004) considers that, overall, the experience has been positive and no implementation issues 
have been raised. Some problems are related with some provisions of NAFTA that may have 
undermined the ability to establish higher environmental standards (like investment provisions), but 
its assessment is rather positive.  
In the case of the labour agreements, similar advances were made, although funding and 
staffing problems were identified. So far, no dispute settlement procedure has been triggered for 
non-compliance of the obligation to enforce its domestic legislation. All submissions have been 
resolved in the consultations stages. Critics argue that this is because the side agreements do not 
contain substantial obligations and the dispute settlement system is too cumbersome, and not 
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IV. Implementation Problems: Some 
Hypotheses 
Why Mexico and Chile were successful in adopting and 
implementing a trade strategy based on export-led growth and the rest 
of LAC have been less so? This is a very difficult question to answer. 
There are many factors that have influenced economic performance in 
LAC in the past decades and it is difficult to draw common features. 
Nevertheless, some hypotheses may be outlined. In the first place, 
both countries, unlike others in LAC, have emphasised 
macroeconomic stability has a key component of their overall 
economic strategy, but not withstanding economic crisis, have been 
more persistent in their approach providing clear signals to economic 
agents of the intertemporal consistency of policies and reducing the 
risk of policy reversal.  
In the second place, and related to the former, the reform 
process in Mexico and Chile is more mature, meaning that both 
countries undertook a persistent approach to economic reform, 
addressing different aspects that affected economic activity like the 
role of the State, the quality of intervention of the state agencies in 
economic activity through their regulatory activities. But not only 
economic policy instruments were modified; also institutions were 
changed or created.7 
A third aspect is related to public officials. Chile has a long 
tradition of reasonably well-educated and capable bureaucracy, 
                                                     
7
 According to Lederman, Maloney and Servén (2003) institutional reforms “especially those aimed to improve the rule of law and 
fight corruption, will be critical for the future economic development” in LAC. Even for a country like Mexico, which has done a 
great effort, this is an aspect that must be tackled in order to reduce the institutional gap with the U.S. 
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although some problems remain (Aninat, Londregan, Navia and Vial, 2004). On the other hand, 
when Mexico embarked on a deep economic reform, including trade policy, authorities decided to 
attract well trained and educated professionals that had been in charge of the formulation and 
application of trade policy, as reviewed by Ortiz Mena (2001, 2004) and Cameron and Tomlin 
(2000).  
In fact, one important problem in LAC is related with the infrastructure of the public sector, 
in terms of equipment, but also in terms of working material. For instance, normally there are no 
libraries, or they are badly supplied ones in ministries with no journals and few books dealing with 
the subject public officials must decide on. Usually, public officials acquire their own books and 
gather information from whatever sources are available. Today, the Internet has helped to redress 
this situation, but only to some extent.  
Because of the role that trade policy institutions played after the Second World War in LAC, 
they were not well suited to handle the new approach. In general, trade institutions are very weak, 
have limited budget resources, low technical capacity, and are understaffed. Until a decade ago, 
they played a secondary role mostly to administer prices, trade restrictions, and respond to 
protectionist interests and fiscal needs: trade institutions have been low priority for most 
governments up to now. Because public service salaries are low, public servants that acquire a 
marginal expertise may be offered a better salary in the private sector. 



































As already mentioned, Mexico resolved it when the decision to integrate with the U.S. was 
adopted; Colombia followed a similar approach when it created the Trade Ministry taking off this 
responsibility from Foreign Affairs, and it took Chile almost seven years (1990-1997) to reach its 
current level of expertise (Silva, 2001). 
Chapter Nineteen 
Administration of the Agreement and Trade Capacity Building 
Section B: Trade Capacity Building 
Article 19.4: Committee on Trade Capacity Building 
1. Recognizing that trade capacity building assistance is a catalyst for the reforms 
and investments necessary to foster trade-driven economic growth, poverty reduction, 
and adjustment to liberalised trade, the Parties hereby establish a Committee on Trade 
Capacity Building, comprising representatives of each Party. 
2. In furtherance of the Parties’ ongoing trade capacity building efforts and in order 
to assist each Central American Party and the Dominican Republic to implement this 
Agreement and adjust to liberalized trade, each such Party should periodically update 
and provide to the Committee its national trade capacity building strategy. 
3. The Committee shall: 
(a) seek the prioritization of trade capacity building projects at the national or 
regional level, or both;  
(b) invite appropriate international donor institutions, private sector entities, and 
nongovernmental organizations to assist in the development and implementation of 
trade capacity building projects in accordance with the priorities set out in each national 
trade capacity building strategy; 
(c) work with other committees or working groups established under this Agreement, 
including through joint meetings, in support of the development and implementation of 
trade capacity building projects in accordance with the priorities set out in each national 
trade capacity building strategy; 
(d) monitor and assess progress in implementing trade capacity building projects; 
and 
(e) provide a report annually to the Commission describing the Committee’s 
activities, unless the Committee otherwise decides. 
4. During the transition period, the Committee shall meet at least twice a year, 
unless the Committee otherwise decides. 
5. The Committee may establish terms of reference for the conduct of its work. 
6. The Committee may establish ad hoc working groups, which may comprise 
government or non-government representatives, or both.  
7. All decisions of the Committee shall be taken by consensus, unless the 
Committee otherwise decides. 
8. The Parties hereby establish an initial working group on customs administration 
and trade facilitation, which shall work under and report to the Committee. 
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Capacity building activities have addressed part of the problem LAC faces in the trade policy 
area. In fact, capacity building activities have been designed, in general, as a knowledge 
transferring device, but cannot address the structural problem of the civil service at LAC: namely, 
salaries and career opportunities. Normally, capacity building activities are short-lived, because of 
public servants turnover.  
To strengthen trade ministries in LAC, two important problems must be overcome. The first 
one, salaries, is difficult to resolve because almost every economy is under very severe budgetary 
constraints. The second one, career opportunities, is easier to implement, but it is not exclusively a 
problem of this area: it is normally a problem of the whole sector. Public sector in LAC expanded 
inorganically during several decades and appointments were often a consequence of political 
influence.  
In the context of recent negotiations, the need to address the institutional weakness of trading 
partners has been acknowledged. The CAFTA agreement has included in chapter 19 
“Administration of the Agreement and Trade Capacity Building”, a framework to deal with this 
issue (Box 2). The ability of CAFTA countries to take advantage of this provision is conditional 
upon their ability to design a national trade capacity building strategy, and on the possibility of 
donor institutions to provide the needed support. In the context of the FTAA negotiations, ECLAC, 
IDB and OAS were requested by the participant countries to help to identify their needs and 
establish a methodology to design their national strategies.  
This is a convenient process, because it is the responsibility of the countries to identify their 
needs as demandeurs; and for donors it is an appropriate means to co-ordinate their efforts and 
avoid duplication.  
In the context of the current negotiations between the U.S. and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, 
a similar chapter is being negotiated and probably the approach will be very similar. In the FTAA 
negotiations, capacity building activities have been organised by ECLAC, IDB, and the OAS, with 
the support of other international organisations like the WTO and UNCTAD. Also, as was 
mentioned, at the Ministerial Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Trade held in Quito, Ecuador, 
in November 2002, ministers approved the Hemispheric Co-operation Program (HCP), “Program is 
intended to strengthen the capacities of those countries seeking assistance to participate in the 
negotiations, implement their trade commitments, and address the challenges and maximise the 
benefits of hemispheric integration, including productive capacity and competitiveness in the 
region”.  
The Program includes a mechanism to assist countries to develop national and/or sub-
regional trade capacity building strategies that “define, prioritise and articulate their needs and 
programs pursuant to those strategies, and to identify sources of financial and non-financial 
support”.  
The Tripartite Committee integrated by ECLAC, IDB, and OAS is entrusted with facilitating 
meetings of the Consultative Group-Small Economies (CGSE), inviting appropriate development 
and financial officials, international financial institutions, international agencies, and interested 
private entities, to discuss financing and implementation of the HCP. 
Although this capacity building initiative at the regional, sub-regional and individual levels 
are important to support trade liberalisation in the Western Hemisphere, it is still a question mark, 
whether they will last because they are not dealing with the structural problems mentioned above. 
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V. Some Policy Lessons 
Latin American countries embarked in an active integration 
process through regional and bilateral trade agreements. These 
agreements have been negotiated under the general and flexible 
framework of ALADI that was also the framework used to sign 
preferential trade agreements in the context of import substitution 
policies. Today integration process is different from the old 
regionalism in several aspects, in particular, the general economic 
policy orientation where it takes place.  
Under this new approach trade agreements are more complex, 
contain more elaborated disciplines modeled in the GATT/WTO 
provisions and NAFTA, and include a number of highly complex 
issues, notably, investment, services, intellectual property rights 
disciplines. Also regulatory issues, dealing with formulation, adoption 
and application of policies, including transparency provisions, are 
changing the institutional environment under which economic policy 
takes place and forcing institutional changes in the region.  
This development has been identified as a source of 
implementation problems of international agreements for several Latin 
American countries. Chile and Mexico stand as countries that have 
pursued active integration policies, under the NAFTA type agreements 
and have faced with relative success the challenges that 
implementation implies.  
Although problems may still exist in both cases, they do not 
seem to be too large and have not paralyzed trade policy in those 
countries. One important reason for this is the fact that both countries 
embarked  in economic reforms earlier, the reforms are more mature  
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and have produced results, allowing for the continuation of reforms over time, in particular their 
improvements.  
This means that the provisions contained in trade agreements did not demand significant 
modifications in economic policies, and in those cases where chances were significant; countries 
have invested in new institutions and policies reforms. This was specially the case of the Mexican 
experiences prior to the entry into force of NAFTA, but Chile also confronted changes on a timely 
basis. Investment in institutional reform both in terms of human capital and infrastructure, is still 
underway, and has proved to be an important element of endogenous capacity building that have 
last over time and have not been eroded with political changes. 




Aninat, C., J.. Londregan, P. Navia and J.. Vial (2004), “Political Institutions, 
Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Chile”, September, 
IADB. 
Cameron, M. and B.W. Tomlin (2000), The Making of NAFTA: How the deal 
was done, Cornell University Press. 
Devlin, R. and A. Estevadeordal (2001), “What’s New in the New 
Regionalism in the Americas?” INTAL-ITD-STA, Working Paper 6, May. 
Devlin, R. and P. Giordano (2004): “The Old and New Regionalism: Benefits, 
Costs, and Implications for the FTAA”, in Estevadeordal, A., D. Rodrik, 
A.M. Taylor and A. Velasco (eds): Integrating the Americas, published by 
Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. 
Elliot, K.A. (2004), “Labor Standards and the FTAA”, in Estevadeordal, A., 
D. Rodrik, A.M. Taylor and A. Velasco (eds) (2004): Integrating the 
Americas, Published by Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for 
Latin American Studies. 
Estevadeordal, A., D. Rodrik, A.M. Taylor and A. Velasco (eds) (2004), 
Integrating the Americas, published by Harvard University, David 
Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. 
Esty, D. (2004), “The Environmental Dimension of Economic Integration: 
The FTAA and Beyond”, in Estevadeordal, A., D. Rodrik, A.M. Taylor 
and A. Velasco (eds) (2004): Integrating the Americas, published by 
Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. 
Finger, J. Michael and Philip Schuler (2002) “Implementation of WTO 
Commitments: The Development Challenge”, Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya 
Mattoo and Philip English eds., Development, Trade, and the WTO, a 
Handbook, the World Bank, Washington D.C. 
GAO, (1997), “North American Free Trade Agreement: Impacts and 
Implementation”, Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director, 
International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and 
International Affairs Division, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-256. 
Implementing trade policy in Latin America: The cases of Chile and Mexico 
34 
Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J. Schott (2004), “The Prospects for a Deeper North American Integration: A U.S. 
Perspective”, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary No. 195, January. 
_____ (1993), “NAFTA: An Assessment”, Institute for International Economics, WDC.  
Katz, Julius (2001), El tratado de libre comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN): Una modalidad de 
negociación de un acuerdo de libre comercio, Estevadeordal, Antoni, ed.; Robert, Carolyn, ed. Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo, Las Américas sin barreras: negociaciones comerciales de acceso a mercados 
de los años noventa, Washington D.C. 
Lederman, D., W.F. Maloney and L. Servén (2003), Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the 
Caribbean Countries: A summary of research findings, World Bank, WDC.  
OECD/BID (2004), “Politicas y Ley de Competencia en México: examen inter pares de la OCDE”, February. 
Ortiz Mena, A. (2001), “Apertura comercial y reforma institucional en México (1988-2000): un análisis 
comparado del TLCAN y el TLCUE”, Foro Internacional, vol XLI 73160, México. 
Ortiz Mena, A. (2004), “O processo de formulação da política de comercio nas Américas: lições da 
experiência mexicana”, paper presented at the 45th Annual meeting of ISA, Montreal, Canadá. 
Sáez, S. (1999), Estrategia y negociación en el sistema multilateral de comercio, Dolmen Ediciones, Santiago 
de Chile. 
Sáez, S. and J. G. Valdés (1999), “Chile y su política comercial ‘lateral’”, Revista de la CEPAL 67, April. 
Silva, V. (2001), “Estrategia y agenda comercial chilena en los años noventa”, Serie Comercio Internacional # 
11, CEPAL. 
Stern, R.M.(1997), “Constituent Interest Group Influences on U.S. Trade Policies Since the Advent of the 
WTO”, Discussion Paper No. 416 University of Michigan, December. 
 












Issues published  
1 Las barreras medioambientales a las exportaciones latinoamericanas de camarones, María Angélica Larach, 
(LC/L.1270-P), Nº de venta S.99.II.G.45 (US$ 10.00), octubre de 1999.  
2 Multilateral Rules on Competition Policy:  An Overview of the Debate, Berend R. Paasman (LC/L1143-P), Sales  
Nº E.99.II.63 (US$ 10.00), December 1999.   
3 Las condiciones de acceso a los mercados de bienes:  algunos problemas pendientes, Verónica Silva y Johannes 
Heirman, (LC/L.1297-P), Nº de venta S.99.II.G.62 (US$ 10.00), diciembre de 1999.   
4 Open Regionalism in Asia Pacific and Latin America: a Survey of the Literature, Mikio Kuwayama, (LC/L.1306-P), 
Sales Nº E.99.II.20 (US$ 10.00), December 1999.   
5 Trade Reforms and Trade Patterns in Latin America, Vivianne Ventura-Dias, Mabel Cabezas y Jaime Contador, 
(LC/L.1306-P), Sales Nº E.00.II.G.23 (US$ 10.00), December 1999.   
6 Comparative Analysis of Regionalism in Latin America and Asia Pacific, Ramiro Pizarro, (LC/L.1307-P), Sales 
Nº E.99.II.G.21 (US$ 10.00), December 1999.   
7 Exportaciones no tradicionales latinoamericanas. Un enfoque no tradicional, Valentine Kouzmine, (LC/L.1392-
P), Nº de venta S.00.II.G.65. (US$ 10.00), junio de 2000.   
8 El sector agrícola en la integración económica regional:  Experiencias comparadas de América Latina y la Unión 
Europea, Miguel Izam, Valéry Onffroy de Vérez, (LC/L.1419-P), Nº de venta S.00.II.G.91  (US$ 10.00), 
septiembre de 2000   
9 Trade and investment promotion between Asia−Pacific and Latin America: Present position and future prospects, 
Mikio Kuwayama, José Carlos Mattos and Jaime Contador (LC/L.1426-P),  Sales Nº E.00.II.G.100 (US$ 10.00),,  
September 2000.   
10 El comercio de los productos transgénicos: el estado del debate internacional, María Angélica Larach, 
(LC/L.1517-P), N° de venta S.01.II.G.60 (US$ 10.00), marzo de 2000   
11 Estrategia y agenda comercia l  chilena en los años noventa, Verónica Silva (LC/L.1550-P), N° de venta 
S.01.II.G.94 (US$ 10.00), junio de 2001.   
12 Antidumping in the Americas, José Tavares de Araujo Jr., Carla Macario, Karsten Steinfatt, (LC/L.1392-P), Sales 
N° E.01.II.G.59 (US$ 10.00), March 2001.   
13  E-Commerce and Export Promotion Policies for Small-and Medium-Sized Enterprises: East Asian and Latin 
American Experiences 90, Mikio Kuwayama (LC/L.1619-P), Sales N° E.01.II.G.159 (US$ 10.00), October 2001.  
 
14 América Latina: las exportaciones de productos básicos durante los años noventa, Valentine Kouzmine, 
(LC/L.1634-P), N° de venta S.01.II.G.171 (US$ 10.00), diciembre de 2001.   
15 Análisis del comercio entre América Latina y los países de Europa Central y Oriental durante la segunda mitad de 
los años  noventa, Valentine Kouzmine, (LC/L.1653-P), N° de venta S.01.II.G.191  (US$ 10.00), diciembre de 
2001  
16 Los desafíos de la clasificación de los servicios y su importancia para las negociaciones comerciales, José Carlos 
Mattos, (LC/L.1678.-P), N° de venta S.00.II.G.217  (US$ 10.00), diciembre de 2001.  www 
17 The Gender Dimension of Globalization: A review of the literature with a focus on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Maria Thorin, (LC/L.1679-P), Sales N° E.01.II.G223 (US$ 10.00), December 2001.  www 
18 Tendencias municipales del comercio, la política comercial y los acuerdos de integración de los países de la 
Asociación de Estados del Caribe (AEC),  Johannes Heirman, (LC/L.1661-P),  N° de venta S.01.II.G.216 (US$ 
10.00), noviembre de2001.  www 
19 Facilitación del comercio: un concepto urgente para un tema recurrente, Miguel Izam,(LC/L.1680-P), N° de venta 
S.01.II.G.218 (US$ 10.00), abril de 2001.  www 
20 Not	
	 ão de uma área de livre comercio com os  Estados Unidos, Vivianne 




Implementing trade policy in Latin America: The cases of Chile and Mexico 
36 
21 La liberación del sector de servicios: el caso del tratado Unión Europea/México, Philippe Ferreira Portela, 
(LC/L.1682-P), N° de venta S.01.II.G.220. (US$ 10.00), diciembre de 2001.  www 
22 Production sharing in Latin American  trade: The contrasting experience of Mexico and Brazil, Vivianne Ventura-
Dias and José Durán Lima, ( LC/L.1683.-P), Sales N° E.00.II.G.221 (US$ 10.00), December 2001. www 
23 El camino hacia las nuevas negociaciones comerciales en la OMC (post-Doha), Verónica Silva, (LC/L.1684-P), 
N° de venta S.01.II.G.224 (US$ 10.00), diciembre de 2001.  www 
24 Legal and Economic Interfaces between Antidumping and Competition Policy, José Tavares de Araujo Jr., 
(LC/L.1685-P), Sales N° E.01.II.G.222 (US$ 10.00), December 2001.  www 
25 Los procesos de integración de los países de América Latina y el Caribe 2000-2001: avances, retrocesos y temas 
pendientes, Renato Baumann, Inés Bustillo, Johannes Heirman, Carla Macario, Jorge Máttar y Estéban Pérez, 
(LC/L.1780–P) N° de venta:S.02.II.G.95 (US$ 10.00), septiembre de 2002.  www 
26 La calidad de la inserción internacional de América Latina y el Caribe en el comercio mundial, Mikio Kuwayama, 
José Durán (LC/L.1897-P), N° de venta: S.03.II.G.56 (US$ 10.00), mayo de 2003.  www 
27 What can we say about trade and growth when trade becomes a complex system?, Vivianne Ventura-Dias, 
(LC/L.1898-P), N° de venta: E.03.II.G.57 (US$ 10.00), July 2003.  www  
28 Normas de origen y procedimientos para su administración en América Latina, Miguel Izam, (LC/L.1907–P), N° de 
venta:S.03.II.G.65 (US$ 10.00) mayo de 2003.  www 
29 E-commerce Environment and Trade Promotion for Latin America: Policy Implications from East Asian and Advanced 
Economies’ Experiencies, Yasushi Ueki, (LC/L1918-P), Sales N° E.03.II.G.80 (US$ 10.00), June 2003.  www 
30 América Latina: el comercio internacional de productos lácteos, Valentine Kouzmine, (LC/L.1950-P), N° de venta: 
S.03.II.G.108 (US$ 10.00), agosto de 2003.  www 
31 Rules of Origin and Trade Facilitation in Preferential Trade Agreements in Latin America (LC/L.1945-P), Sales N° 
E.03.IIG.103 (US$ 10.00) August 2003.  www 
32 Avance y vulnerabilidad de la integración económica de América Latina y el Caribe, Raúl Maldonado 
(LC/L.1947-P), N° de venta:S.03.II.G.105 (US$ 10.00), agosto de 2003.    
33 Mercados nuevos y tradicionales para las exportaciones de productos básicos latinoamericanos al final del siglo 
XX, Valentine Kouzmine (LC/L.1975-P), N° de venta: S.03.II.G.132 (US$ 10.00), octubre de 2003.    
34 E-business Innovation and Customs Renovation for Secure Supply Chain Management, Yasushi Ueki (LC/L2035-P) 
Sales N° E.03.II.G.195 (US$ 10.00), December 2003    
35 El camino mexicano hacia el regionalismo abierto: los acuerdos de libre comercio de México con América del 
Norte y Europa. Alicia Puyana, (LC/L.2036-P), N° de venta: S.03.II.G.213  (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003..    
36 La estrategia chilena de acuerdos comerciales: un análisis político, Ignacio Porras, (LC/L.2039-P), N° de venta: 
S.03.II.G.199 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003    
37 La cooperación financiera en América Latina y el Caribe: las instituciones financieras subregionales en el fomento 
de las inversiones y del comercio exterior, Raúl Maldonado (LC/L.LC/L.2040.P), N° de venta: S.03.II.G.200 
(US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003.    
38 Fomento y diversificación de exportaciones de servicios, Francisco Prieto, (LC/L.2041-P), N° de venta: 
S.03.II.G.201 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003    
39 El acuerdo sobre la aplicación de medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias: contenido y alcance para América Latina y el 
Caribe, M. Angélica Larach, (LC/L.2045-P) N° de venta: S.03.II.G.206 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003.    
40 La dimensión del desarrollo en la política de competencia, Verónica Silva, (LC/L.2047-P) N° de venta: 
S.03.II.G.210 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003.    
41 La nueva ley de Seguridad Agrícola y de Inversión Rural de los Estados Unidos (Farm Bill). Un análisis de sus 
implicancias comerciales, Carlos Basco, Iván Bucccellato, Valentina Delich, Diane Tussie, (LC/L.2049-P), N° de 
venta: S.03.II.G.211 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003.    
42 Oportunidades y desafíos de los vínculos económicos de China y América Latina y el Caribe, Hernán Gutiérrez, 
(LC/L.2050-P), N° de venta: S.03.II.G.212 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003.    
43 Maritime Transport Liberalization and the Challenges to further its Implementation in Chile, José Carlos S. 
Mattos & María José Acosta, (LC/L.2051-P), Sales  N° : S.03.II.G.214 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003.    
44 Comercio intra-firma: concepto, alcance y magnitud, José Durán y Vivianne Ventura-Dias (LC/L.2052-P), N° de 
venta: S.03.II.G.215 (US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003..    
45 Ampliación de la Unión Europea hacia los países de Europa Central y Oriental: una evaluación preliminar del 
impacto para América Latina y el Caribe, J.E. Durán y Raúl Maldonado, (LC/L.2053) N° de venta: S.03.II.G.216 
(US$ 10.00), diciembre 2003    
46 Globalización y servicios: cambios estructurales en el comercio internacional, Vivianne Ventura-Dias, María José 
Acosta, Mikio Kuwayama, José Carlos Mattos, José Durán, (LC/L.2054-P), N° de venta: S.03.II.G.217 (US$ 
10.00), diciembre 2003    
CEPAL − SERIE Comercio internacional N° 54 
 
37 
47 La verificación de las normas de origen en los principales acuerdos de comercio preferencial de Bolivia, Miguel 
Izam, (LC/L.2161-P), N° de venta: S.04.II.G.89 (US$ 10.00), julio del 2004.    
48 Creando condiciones para el desarrollo productivo: políticas de competencia, Graciela Moguillansky y Verónica 
Silva (LC/L.2198-P), N° de venta: S.04.II.G.124 (US$ 10.00), octubre del 2004.    
49 Cooperación en política de competencia y acuerdos comerciales en América Latina y el Caribe (ALC), Verónica 
Silva (LC/L.2244-P), N° de venta: S.04.II.G.164 (US$ 10.00), diciembre del 2004.   
50 Latin American South-South Integration and Cooperation: From a Regional Public Goods Perspectiva, Mikio 
Kuwayama, (LC/L.2245-P), Sales N° E.04.II.G.112 (US$ 10.00), February 2005.   
51 Políticas de competencia y acuerdos de libre comercio en América Latina y el Caribe: aprendiendo de la 
experiencia internacional, Iván Valdés (LC/L.2365-P), N° de venta: S.05.II.G.104 (US$ 10.00), agosto del 2005. 
 
52 La deslocalización de funciones no esenciales de las empresas: Oportunidades para exportar servicios. El caso de 
Chile, Joaquín Piña (LC/L.2390-P), N° de venta: S.05.II.G.133 (US$ 10.00), septiembre del 2005.  
53 Implicaciones del Término del Acuerdo sobre los Textiles y el Vestuario (ATV) para el Norte de América Latina, 
Mikio Kuwayama y Martha Cordero, (LC/L.2399-P), Sales N° S.05.II.G.165 (US$ 10.00), octubre del 2005.  
 
54 Implementing Trade Policy in Latin America: The Cases of Chile and Mexico, Sebastián Sáez, (LC/L.2406-P),  




• Readers wishing to obtain the above publications can do so by writing to the following address: ECLAC, Division of 
International Trade and Integration, Casilla 179-D, Santiago, Chile. 
• Publications available for sale should be ordered from the Distribution Unit, ECLAC, Casilla 179-D, Santiago, Chile, Fax (562) 210 
2069, E-mail: publications@eclac.cl. 
 
These publications are also available on the Internet: http://www.eclac.org/  and http://www.cepal.org 
 
Name: ............................................................................................................................................  
Activity: .........................................................................................................................................  
Address: .........................................................................................................................................  
Postal code, city, country:..............................................................................................................  
Tel.:...................................Fax: ........................ E.mail address: ...................................................  
 
